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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No* 890583-CA 
v. : 
DAVID VANCE GROVIER : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence entered on June 19, 1990 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah. On July 11, 1990, this Court granted defendant's 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his 
vehicle. Because of the trial court's advantageous position in 
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, this 
Court will not reverse the trial court's factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 
1989). However, in assessing the trial court's legal conclusions 
based upon its factual findings, this Court applies a correction 
of error standard. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV i 
The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David Vance Grovier, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance, to wit, 124.8 grams of 
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 21). In a 
pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine 
(R. at 101). Both parties submitted memorandum and an 
evidentiary hearing was held (R. at 70-85, 104-120, 130). The 
trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion 
(R. at 134-135, 144-154, 162-163, Findings and Order). Defendant 
then sought and was granted permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal (R. at 156, 157). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 23, 1990, at approximately 10:30 a.m., 
officer Lynn Davis of Cedar City Police Department received a 
message to call one of his confidential informants (T. at 35). 
The informant, who Davis had previously relied upon approximately 
10-15 times, gave the license plate number of a green 1973 Buick 
Riviera and told Davis that he believed there was "crank" 
(methamphetamine) in the car (T. at 35, 48). According to the 
informant, the man and woman driving the car were on their way 
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out of town and had last been seen on south main street (R. at 
35). Davis relayed the information to Chief of Police, Peter J. 
Hansen, telling Hansen that his source was a reliable 
confidential informant (T. at 8, 35, 48). 
Hansen and officer Kelvin Orton spotted a green Riviera 
matching Davis's description at the Stars Market in south Cedar 
City at approximately 11:10 a.m. and followed it north down Main 
Street for approximately five minutes before Hansen, who was not 
wearing a uniform, requested Sergeant Dennis Anderson, who was 
then on patrol in a marked police car, to stop the Riviera as it 
approached the Iron County Correctional Facility (T. at 9, 93-
94). Upon being stopped, defendant got out of his car and asked 
why he had been pulled over (T. at 95). Anderson told defendant 
that "a citizen had possibly seen him smoking marijuana," to 
which defendant replied, "I don't have anything, go ahead and 
search" (T. at 56-58, 68-69, 95). Anderson then asked, "Can 
we?" to which defendant responded, "Yes" (T. at 95). Anderson 
then explained that additional officers were on the way to help 
and defendant again stated, "I don't have anything in the car. 
Go ahead and search it" (T. at 95-96). 
Hansen and Orton arrived shortly after Anderson stopped 
defendant. Orton performed a brief search of the female 
passenger, Petie Ray Hale, during which a fannypack Hale had 
strapped around her waist was removed and searched by Hansen who 
discovered a marijuana pipe and other paraphernalia inside (T. at 
Sergeant Anderson assumed this was the basis for the stop 
without seeking clarification from Chief Hansen (T. at 95). 
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10). Hale was then placed under arrest and seated in Anderson's 
patrol car (T. 96). 
While Hale was being arrested, Hansen approached 
defendant who was standing by Anderson's patrol car and informed 
him that he wanted to search for drugs, to which defendant 
replied, "go ahead and look" (T. at 11). Hansen then advised 
defendant of his Miranda rights but did not formally arrest him 
(T. at 11; Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, March 19, 1990 
[hereinafter P.H.] at 19). After advising defendant of his 
rights, Hansen asked if defendant's consent to search included 
the "trunk, passenger area, and motor compartment," to which 
defendant responded, "Yes" (T. at 11-12, 23-24, 26-27). Several 
officers then began a search of defendant's vehicle which lasted 
approximately 20 minutes, during which time no controlled 
substances were found (T. at 10; P.H. at 40). 
Hansen then approached defendant a second time, telling 
him he believed that there were drugs in the car, and asked 
defendant if he would tell him where to find them (T. at 13-14). 
Defendant became somewhat agitated at this point and responded, 
"Give me a break, Chief. Come on. There's nothing there. You 
guys are picking on me. . . . There ought to be a law against 
people looking in people's cars like this" (T. at 25-26). Hansen 
then informed defendant that he intended "to remove the car from 
the street into the sally port of the correctional facility and 
dismantle the car bolt by bolt if necessary," to which defendant 
replied, "Go for it" (T. at 14-15, 28-31). Defendant was then 
handcuffed and he, along with the vehicle and codefendant Hale, 
_A_ 
were transported to the correctional facility, approximately 200 
yards from the initial stop (T. at 15, 96, 100; R. at 149). 
Defendant stated that he did not want his car "torn apart," and 
that "[tjhere ought to be a law against searching," while riding 
in the back of Anderson's patrol car on the way to the 
correctional facility (T. at 96-97). Once at the facility, 
defendant, who was not formally charged at this time, was seated 
in an interview room inside the pre-admissions area while the 
search was continued (T. at 15-17, 50-51; P.H. at 43). While 
there, defendant requested to speak with Hansen and informed him 
that he did not have permission to dismantle the car (T. at 17, 
50-51). Hansen then instructed the officers conducting the 
search not to dismantle defendant's car (T. at 17-18). Defendant 
was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained while he was searched 
by correctional officer, Gary Bulloch, to whom defendant stated, 
"They better not fuckin' tear it apart" (T. at 50-52). 
When the suspected drugs were not discovered after a 
cursory search, Hansen left the sally port to try and obtain a 
warrant to dismantle the car (T. at 17). Hansen turned the 
search over to Davis, before leaving the area at approximately 
12:30 p.m., and told Davis that he had noticed a strange odor 
coming from the driver's seat area of the car (T. at 17, 20). 
Davis also noticed a "chemical-type smell" around the driver's 
seat which he believed to be methamphetamine and began his search 
of defendant's vehicle in that general area (T. at 38). When he 
did not find anything in or around the seat, Davis looked under 
the dash with a flashlight (T. at 41-43). To see better, Davis 
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attempted to move an undamped heater hose aside and acciaentaiiy 
disconnected it (T. at 41-43, 45-46). When Davis shined his 
flashlight inside the hose he noticed something stuffed inside 
(T. 42-44). Reaching inside to pull it out, Davis discovered a 
gray cloth wrapped around a ziplock baggy containing 
methamphetamine (T. at 19, 44). Hansen, who had not yet obtained 
a warrant, returned to the sally port at approximately 1:00 p.m., 
just as Davis emerged from defendant's car with the 
methamphetamine (T. at 19). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine seized, the trial court made specific findings of 
fact that (1) defendant voluntarily consented to the search of 
his vehicle; (2) the scope of the search did not exceed the 
limits of defendant's consent; (3) defendant at no time withdrew 
his consent to search; and (4) that if defendant had withdrawn 
his consent, Hansen would have called off the search immediately 
(T. at 104-106, district court's oral findings at the suppression 
hearing June 19, 1990; R. at 144-54, a copy of the district 
court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is 
attached hereto as Addendum A). 
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this 
brief, as pertinent to the specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because there was reasonable suspicion for the stop of 
defendant's vehicle and defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
consented to the search of his vehicle. Although defendant 
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subsequently limited the scope of his consent when he instructed 
police not to dismantle his car, he at no time expressly revoked 
his consent to search and the scope of the search never exceeded 
the limits of defendant's consent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE 
BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS BASED ON A REASONABLE AND 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
INVOLVED IN A CRIME AND DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY 
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence. In reviewing the trial court's 
ruling, this Court applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
"correction of error" standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
In points I and II of his brief, defendant disputes the 
trial court's finding that the State had probable cause to stop 
and seize his vehicle (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of 
App.] at 10-14). However, the trial court did not need to find 
probable cause for the stop of defendant's vehicle because the 
stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
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involved in criminal activity. That reasonable suspicion, 
together with defendant's subsequent voluntary consent to search, 
provided a sufficient basis for the investigatory stop, search 
and subsequent arrest of defendant. 
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle 
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a 
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has 
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic 
regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 
880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A stop of a vehicle is, of course, also justified when 
the officer has probable cause to believe either the vehicle or 
This Court has previously noted that there are three 
constitutionally permissible levels of police stops: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-618 (Utah 1987) (Utah Supreme 
Court adopted the reasoning in United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986)). 
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an occupant has violated the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
at 661, 663. 
The "reasonable suspicion" test was rirst articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). There the Court held that when "a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he 
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his 
suspicion. Jd. at 30. A police officer who makes an 
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and 
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." JEd. at 21. 
The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows: 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion 
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based 
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal 
activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted). These standards apply when a "Terry 
stop" is made in reliance on a bulletin issued by other police 
officers. 
[If] a flyer or bulletin has been issuea un 
the basis of articulable facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion that the wanted person 
has committed an offense, then reliance on 
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to 
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check identification, to pose questions to 
the person, or to detain the person briefly 
while attempting to obtain further 
information. 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989) (quoting United 
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)). 
The stop of defendant's vehicle was based on a tip from 
a confidential informant who had observed drugs in defendant's 
car (R. at 146). Although defendant argues that the tip was 
insufficient to establish probable cause to stop and arrest him, 
he appears to concede that the tip constituted reasonable 
suspicion to support an investigatory stop of his vehicle (Br. of 
App. at 11-12). Reasonable suspicion may be based on an 
informant's tip as long as it is sufficiently reliable. Alabama 
v. White, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2414-2415 (1990); Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972)). See United States v. 
Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted). The United States Supreme Court noted in Alabama v. 
White that the "totality of the circumstances" test for 
determining probable cause was "also relevant in the reasonable 
suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying 
[it] for the lesser showing required to meet that standard." Id. 
at 2415. 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding 
standard than probable cause not only in the 
sense that reasonable suspicion can be 
established with information that is 
different in quantity or content than that 
required to establish probable cause, but 
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion 
can arise from information that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable 
cause. Adams v. Williams, supra, 
demonstrates as much. We there assumed that 
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the unverified tip from the known informant 
might not have been reliable enough to 
establish probable cause, but nevertheless 
found it sufficiently reliable to justify a 
Terry stop. 407 U.S., at 147, 92 S.Ct., at 
1923-24. Reasonable suspicion, like probable 
cause, is dependent upon both the content of 
the information possessed by police and its 
degree of reliability. Both factors -
quantity and quality - are considered in the 
11
 totality of the circumstances - the whole 
picture," United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 
(1981), that must be taken into account when 
evaluating whether there is reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively 
low degree of reliability, more information 
will be required to establish the requisite 
quantum of suspicion than would be required 
if the tip were more reliable. 
Id. at 2416. 
3 
Unlike the anonymous tip in Alabama v. White, the 
informant in this case was known to Officer Davis and had 
previously tipped him approximately 10-15 times (T. at 35, 48). 
The morning of February 23, 1990, the informant tipped Davis 
again, informing him that he had observed "crank" (a tan powdery 
substance) in an older, green Buick Riviera being driven by a man 
and woman (R. at 146; T. at 36). The informant gave the car's 
license plate number and stated that he had last seen it at the 
The investigatory stop analyzed in Alabama v. White was made 
pursuant to an anonymous telephone tip that White would be 
leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a 
particular vehicle, that she would be going to a particular 
motel, and that she would be in possession of cocaine. The 
police immediately proceeded to the apartment building, saw a 
vehicle matching the caller's description, observed White as she 
left the building and entered the vehicle, and followed her along 
the most direct route to the motel, stopping her vehicle just 
short of the motel. Even though the tipster was anonymous, under 
a totality of the circumstances, the Court held that the tip had 
been sufficiently corroborated by the time the officers stopped 
White to furnish reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in 
criminal activity. Jd. at 2416. 
- i i -
south end of Main Street in Cedar City (R. at 146; T. at 36), 
The informant also told Davis that he believed the occupants of 
the green Riviera were on their way out of town (T. at 36). 
Based on this information, defendant's vehicle was stopped on 
north Main Street, in front of the Iron County Correctional 
Facility, a short while later (T. at 7). 
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 23 (1972), as in this 
case, the tipster was not anonymous, but rather, a reliable 
confidential informant. The officer in Adams v. Williams acted 
on information, supplied moments earlier by an informant known to 
him, that Williams was sitting in a nearby vehicle carrying a 
4 
weapon and narcotics. After talking to the informant, the 
officer approached the vehicle and asked Williams to open his car 
5 
door. Williams lowered the window and the officer reached into 
the car and found a loaded handgun in Williams waistband. On 
appeal, Williams claimed the seizure of his pistol was not 
justified "absent a more reliable informant, or some 
corroboration of the tip." Iji. at 145. The United States Supreme 
Court disagreed. Noting that "this is a stronger case than 
obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip," the Court 
held that "the information carried enough indicia of reliability 
to justify the forcible stop of Williams," where: (1) "[t]he 
The informant apparently gave no indication as to how he had 
obtained this information. 
5 
Although Williams's vehicle was not in motion prior to the 
encounter, the Court appeared to assume a seizure had occurred 
for fourth amendment purposes prior to the search for the weapon, 
as it was not contended that Williams acted voluntarily in 
rolling down the window of his car. Id. at 146 n.l. 
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informant was known to him personally and (2) had provided him 
with information in the past." ^d. at 146. 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject 
[Williams'] argument that reasonable cause 
for a stop and frisk can only be based on the 
officer's personal observation, rather than 
on information supplied by another person. 
Informants' tips, like all other clues and 
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, 
may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability. One simple rule will not cover 
every situation. Some tips, completely 
lacking in indicia of reliability, would 
either warrant no police response or require 
further investigation before a forcible stop 
of a suspect would be authorized. But in 
some situations - for example, when the 
victim of a street crime seeks immediate 
police aid and gives a description of his 
assailant, or when a credible informant warns 
of a specific impending crime - the 
subtleties of the hearsay rule should not 
thwart an appropriate police response. 
Id. at 147. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 683 (informant's wealth of 
detail concerning the robbery, coupled with her admission of 
tangential participation in the robbery, established informant's 
reliability and aroused a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity). 
Several courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, have applied Adams v. Williams, in finding the requisite 
"indicia of reliability" in an informant's tip. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 504, 507 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(confidential informant's tip bore sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify investigatory stop where informant had 
provided information in the past, was characterized as "reliable 
citizen-type," and provided detailed information concerning 
manner in which vehicle was regularly used to transport 
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marijuana); Thompson, 906 F.2d at 1295-96 (fact that car 
stopped was not exact color described by reliable informant and 
carried different license plates did not destroy officer's 
reasonable suspicion that vehicle he observed was same vehicle 
described in all points bulletin); Commonwealth v. Smith, Pa. 
Super, , 577 A.2d 1387, 1391-92 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1990) 
(sufficient basis existed for investigatory stop where reliable 
informant described defendant, stating he had just observed him 
selling cocaine in a specific location and defendant began acting 
suspiciously as soon as he perceived presence of police); Kaiser 
v. State, 24 Ark. App. 19, 746 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Ark. Ct. App.) 
(where police considered confidential informant reliable, they 
had reasonable suspicion for stop when the described vehicle, 
bearing the predicted license plate, appeared in the described 
area, within the predicted period of time), rev'd, 296 Ark. 125, 
752 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ark. 1988) (reversed and remanded on the 
ground that record was devoid of testimony concerning informant's 
reliability). Cf. State v. Bullington, Ariz. , 795 P.2d 
1294, 1296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (failing to cite Adams v. 
Williams, or otherwise analyze the informant's reliability, court 
attempts to distinguish Alabama v. White to reach conclusion that 
police lacked reasonable suspicion to make investigatory stop of 
van, even though it matched the informant's description because 
informant failed to give any details as to future actions of 
The Gonzales informant did not personally observe drugs in 
defendant's rented car, but had personal knowledge that Gonzales 
rented the car for the express purpose of transporting and 
distributing drugs. 
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suspects and nothing occurred prior to stop except for erratic 
7 
driving and several stops). Based on the above analysis, tip 
from the confidential informant constituted at least reasonable 
suspicion for an investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle under 
the fourth amendment. 
Upon being stopped, defendant voluntarily consented to 
a search of his vehicle. As the Supreme Court said in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is "well 
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to 
the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search 
Relying on its own case law and state statutes, the Supreme 
Court of Louisana has applied a similar approach to that in Adams 
v. Williams for determining the reliability of an informant's 
tip: 
We hold the officer's in this case conducted 
a valid investigatory stop. The reasonable 
suspicion required by article 215.1 is 
predicated upon the past reliability of the 
informant, verification by the officers of 
all specific items of supporting information, 
and the rational inferences to be drawn from 
information in such detail that only one with 
actual knowledge could provide it. 
State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1315 (La. 1981) (where 
reliable informant gave the location, make, color and license 
plate number of defendant's vehicle, as well as the time of its 
arrival and a description of the occupants, court found 
reasonable suspicion to justify valid investigatory stop was 
established after officers located vehicle fitting informant's 
description in the described area at the predicted time). See 
State v. Commodore, 418 So.2d 1330, 1332-33 (La. 1982) (where 
previous information received from informant had resulted in 
approximately ten to fifteen narcotics convictions, officers had 
reasonable cause to conduct investigatory stop after they 
observed car fitting informant's description, driven by 
individual named by informant and headed in direction informant 
had indicated). See also State v. Geraci, 518 So.2d 554, 561 
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (court may require corroboration by 
independent sources where the reliability of the informant is not 
satisfactorily demonstrated). 
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that is conducted pursuant to [valid] consent." Jd. at 219 
(citations omitted). For consent to be valid it must be freely 
and voluntarily given. I_d. at 222. This Court has likewise 
recognized the voluntary consent exception to fourth amendment 
requirements. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887. See also State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). To determine whether consent to search was 
voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to 
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result 
of "duress or coercion, express or implied." Marshall, 791 P.2d 
at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The issue of 
whether a defendant voluntarily consented is a question of fact 
on which the state carries the burden of proof. United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
222, 227. See also Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. This Court 
deferentially reviews the trial court's finding that defendant's 
consent was voluntarily given and will not reverse absent clear 
error. Id. 
While this Court has made clear that the state has the 
burden of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly 
specified what standard of proof applies to that burden. In 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82, and Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, the Court 
appears to have adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof 
by embracing the standard espoused in United States v. Abbott, 
546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976). Quoting Abbott, the Webb Court 
set out the following standard which must be met by the State "to 
sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent was given:" 
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(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumpion against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d 885 (quoting 
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). 
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as 
being an unduly strict standard of proof. United States v. 
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 
U.S. 958 (1979). Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes 
a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is 
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only 
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent 
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden 
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the 
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado, 
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States, 
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 557 N.E.2d 1277 
(111. App. 1990); State v. Cross, 576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State 
v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 
Cal.App.3d 1632, 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990). 
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While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this 
context is not universal, see 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
§ 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has 
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the 
majority view. As the Fifth Circuit said in overruling its prior 
decisions that adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof: 
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the preponderance of evidence standard 
supplies the burden which the government must 
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence when the motion concerns 
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v. 
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the 
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless 
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery 
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda 
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
In conformity with the rationale announced 
by the Supreme Court, we overrule our 
previous decisions requiring the government 
at a suppression hearing to prove 
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear 
and convincing evidence. ,f[T]he controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence." United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 
94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 
(1974) . 
United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76. In Lego v. Twomey, the 
Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance 
standard: 
Since the purpose that a voluntariness 
hearing is designed to serve has nothing 
whatever to do with improving the reliability 
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge 
that judging the admissibility of a 
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confession by a preponderance of the evidence 
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not 
concerned with the standards for determining 
the admissibility of evidence or with the 
prosecution's burden of proof at a 
suppression hearing when evidence is 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Winship went no further than to confirm the 
fundamental right that protects "the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . • 
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less 
reliable or less consonant with Winship 
simply because the admissibility of a 
confession is determined by a less stringent 
standard. . . . 
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that 
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional 
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof 
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are 
designed to protect: 
The argument is straightforward and has 
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely 
emphasizing the importance of the values 
served by exclusionary rules is itself 
sufficient demonstration that the 
Constitution also requires admissibility to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has been excluded from federal 
criminal trials for years. The same is true 
of coerced confessions offered in federal or 
state trials. But, from our experience over 
this period of time no substantial evidence 
has accumulated that federal rights have 
suffered from determining admissibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without 
good cause, we are unwilling to expand 
currently applicable exclusionary rules by 
erecting additional barriers to placing 
truthful and probative evidence before state 
juries . . . . Sound reason for moving 
further in this direction has not been 
offered here nor do we discern any at the 
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present time. This is particularly true 
since the exclusionary rules are very much 
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the 
police and prosecution and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's 
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
suppression hearings would be sufficiently 
productive in this respect to outweigh the 
public interest in placing probative evidence 
before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence. 
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted). Although 
the Court said that "the States are free, pursuant to their own 
law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [t]hey may indeed 
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find 
at stake," Id. at 489, the rationale of Lego v. Twomey is sound 
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying 
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Defendant claims his consent could not have been 
voluntary because it was coerced and "not specific and 
unequivocal" (Br. of App. at 17, 19). Defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to the initial search of his car upon being 
stopped (T. at 11-12, 23-27, 56-58, 68-69, 95-96) and does not 
appear to dispute the validity or scope of his initial consent to 
search; rather, defendant focuses his argument on the validity 
and scope of his consent to conduct a second, more extensive 
search of his car in the sally port of the correctional facility 
(Br. of App. at 17-18). 
Defendant asserts his consent was coerced because (1) 
he was not made aware of his right to refuse consent to search 
which consituted an illegal act on the part of police, and (2) he 
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was not free to leave (Br. of App. at 17, point I; 21-22, point 
o 
V). Defendant's contentions are erroneous. Failure to inform 
suspects of their right to refuse consent is not an illegal act; 
rather, a suspects knowledge of the right to refuse consent is 
merely one factor to be considered under the totality of the 
circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. The State is not 
required to prove that defendant knew of his right to refuse to 
consent in order to show voluntariness. jEd. See United States 
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (extending Schneckloth rule 
to situation where consent was obtained from defendant in 
Defendant does not raise Chief Hansen's statement of his intent 
Mto remove the car to the sally port of the correctional facility 
and dismantle [it] bolt by bolt if necessary" (T. at 14-15, 28-
31) as coercive (T. at 13-14). However, even if defendant had 
attempted to argue that Hansen's statement was coercive, at least 
one other court has found similar police conduct to be non-
coercive. In United States v. Long, 866 F.2d 402 (11th Cir. 
1989), police requested defendant's consent to search for 
counterfeit currency they suspected was buried in the yard and 
stated that if he refused they would return and "dig the place 
up." ]ki. at 404. Defendant consented. The court held that the 
consent was voluntary, stating; 
There is no evidence in the record of threat 
or force. The officials testified that 
without any request or promise on the part of 
the officers, Long led the agents to a 
mattress, out by an oak tree, under which 
counterfeit money was buried (Supp. R. 35-
36). Even if the officers stated they could 
come back and "dig the place up," such a 
statement does not amount to coercion. Long 
was free to force the agents to obtain a 
search warrant and, if at that time, he did 
not want "his whole place dug up," Long could 
have cooperated. We agree with the district 
court that the officer's search was lawful. 
Id. at 405. See also United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 361 
(11th Cir. 1989) (citing Long, and holding that agents statement 
to defendant that they would secure the house and attempt to 
obtain a warrant if he refused anything less than an 
unconditional consent was not coercive). 
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custody); United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011, 1013 
(5th Cir. 1990) (defendant's awareness of his right to refuse 
consent merely one of six factors considered in determining 
voluntariness of consent). See also State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (prosecution is not required to prove 
that defendant knew of his right to refuse consent in order to 
show consent was voluntary). Significantly, although defendant 
was not specifically informed of his right to refuse consent, he 
was advised of his Miranda rights prior to the search of his 
vehicle (T. at 11; P.H. at 19). See United States v. Jones, 846 
F.2d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 1988) (in finding that uneducated 
defendant's consent was not voluntarily given, court noted that 
police never apprised defendant of his Miranda rights or of his 
right to refuse a search); United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26, 
33 (2nd Cir.) (fact that defendant in custody was not advised of 
Miranda rights prior to search did not destroy validity of 
consent "since Miranda does not require[] the conclusion that 
knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable element of a 
valid consent." (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246)), cert, 
denied U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 3250 (1990). 
Second, a correct chronology of the facts does not to 
support defendant's contention that he was illegally detained 
prior to his consent to search (Br. of App. at 12, point I; 17, 
point II). In support of his argument defendant relies on his 
detention at the correctional facility (Br. of App. at 12, point 
I; 17, point II). However, defendant was not handcuffed and 
moved to the correctional facility until after after he consented 
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to the search of his vehicle (T. at 14-15, 28-31, 96, 100). Even 
assuming the detention was improper, it could not have had a 
coercive effect on defendant's consent to search. Furthermore, 
it can reasonbly be inferred from the record that defendant was 
still standing alongside Anderson's patrol car, on north Main 
Street (a public area), at the time he told Hansen to "Go for it" 
(T. at 11, 13-15, 28-31). 
Even assuming defendant was not free to leave at the 
time he granted consent to search, it would not preclude a 
finding that his consent was voluntary. Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 
(fact that suspect was under arrest when her consent was given, 
although one relevant factor, does not preclude a finding of 
voluntary consent). See also Moreno, 897 F.2d at 33 (person 
placed in official custody is not thereby rendered incapable of 
giving free and voluntary consent to a warrantless search (citing 
Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25, and United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 
73, 82 (2nd Cir. 1982)); United States v. Jackson, 901 F.2d 83, 
84 (7th Cir. 1990) (that defendant was not free to leave did not 
preclude finding that he voluntarily consented to search); United 
States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1990) (valid 
consent can be given while defendant is in custody); Garcia, 890 
F.2d at 360-62 (11th Cir. 1989) (arrestee's consent to search was 
voluntary although there were 14 agents in and around the home 
and arrestee was handcuffed). 
In support of his claim that his consent was "not 
specific and unequovical, '• defendant alleges that he withdrew his 
consent to search when he told Chief Hansen that he did not have 
permission to "dismantle" his car (Br. of App at 19; T. at 17, 
g 
50-51). Howeverf Hansen interpreted defendant's statement, not 
as a withdrawal of consent, but rather, as a limit on the scope 
of defendant's consent (T. at 29). Accordingly, Hansen informed 
the officers searching defendant's vehicle that they were not to 
"dismantle" defendant's car (T. at 18). Hansen testified that to 
him and his fellow officers, dismantle meant "to take apart with 
tools," and that no tools were used in the search of defendant's 
car (T. at 29). Believing it might be necessary to dismantle the 
vehicle in order to find the drugs, Hansen left the sally port to 
try to obtain a warrant to "dismantle" defendant's vehicle (T. at 
17). Defendant at no time expressly asked police to stop 
searching his car (T. at 18, 74-76, 97). No express threats were 
made to defendant by Hansen or the four other officers conducting 
the search (T. at 18, 32). Had defendant expressly requested 
police to stop searching, Hansen testified that he would have 
complied with that request (Ld.). 
Applying the clear and convincing standard of proof set 
out by this Court in Webb and Marshall, the trial court made 
specific findings of fact that (1) defendant voluntarily 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that his instruction to 
police, not to dismantle his car, limited the scope of his 
consent to search and "police acted beyond [that] restriction[]" 
(Br. of App. at 20-21, point IV). However, defendant fails to 
support his allegation with specific cites to the record; rather, 
he merely asserts that Davis' moving aside an undamped heater 
hose constituted an attempt to dismantle his car (Br. of App. at 
20). The record simply fails to support defendant's allegation 
that the search exceeded the scope of his consent (T. at 17-18, 
29, Testimony of Hansen, discussed in body of this point; 41-43, 
Testimony of Davis). Furthermore, the trial court specifically 
found that the scope of the search did not exceed the scope of 
defendant's consent (R. at 153; see Addendum A). 
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consented to the search of his vehicle; (2) the scope of the 
search did not exceed the limits of defendant's consent; (3) 
defendant at no time withdrew his consent to search; and (4) that 
if defendant had withdrawn his consent, Hansen would have called 
off the search immediately: 
10. Defendant David Vance Grovier did not 
inform Cedar City Police Sergeant Dennis 
Anderson, or any other person, no "not touch 
his car" or to "have the officers stay away 
from his car." On the contrary, the Court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
David Vance Grovier never withdrew his 
consent to search his vehicle, at any time, 
and that the Defendant was never coerced, 
threatened, or under any duress at any time 
by police officers or other persons; in fact, 
the Court finds from the Defendant's own 
testimony that he was never threatened or 
coerced at any time during the search of his 
vehicle. 
11. The Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence, and from direct testimony of the 
peace officers that testified, that if 
Defendant David Vance Grovier had made any 
statement calculated to revoke his consent to 
search the vehicle, they (each of the 
officers) would have immediately stopped the 
search. The Court further finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Defendant never 
made any statements, to any peace officer, in 
the nature of "stop the search" or "don't 
search anymore" of "don't touch my car" but, 
rather Defendant David Vance Grovier 
consented to a search of his vehicle on at 
least three (3) separate and never withdrew 
said consent. 
12. The Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Defendant's statements of 
"someone's going to sue over this" and "these 
officers better not dismantle my car" were 
limiting statements made by Defendant during 
the search. The Court further finds that 
said limits of the search, placed on police 
officers by the Defendant, were never 
exceeded and, in fact, the officers did not 
exceed the scope of the consent at any time. 
The Court finds by clear and convincing 
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evidence that Agent Davis found the 
methamphetamine by looking lup under the dash 
and a heater hose (undamped at either end 
and containing the approximate one-third 
(1/3) pound of mehtamphetamine) simply fell 
away as Agent Davis moved it aside with his 
hand. 
13. The Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that Agent Davis did not go beyond 
the scope permitted by the Defendant's 
consent and did not damage the car, dismantle 
the car, tear the car apart, or do anything 
but merely push aside an unconnected heater 
hose which contained the hidden controlled 
substances. 
(R. at 150-51, see Addendum A). 
For the purposes of legal analysis, this Court must 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings are 
not to be distrubed unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. 
Applying the preponderance standard of proof as urged by the 
State, the trial court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly 
supported by the record. Should this Court choose to apply the 
stiffer Webb standard, the voluntariness of defendant's consent 
is admittedly a closer question. However, the trial court 
applied the clear and convincing standard of proof when it 
evaluated the testimony at the suppression hearing and found 
defendant's consent to be voluntary, even under that strict 
standard. The record supports that conclusion as well. Under 
either standard of proof, and considering the totality of the 
circumstances, this Court can conclude that the trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent is not clearly erroneous. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully 
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's 
motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 13^Siay of November, 1990. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
PETIE KAY HALE and 
DAVID VANCE GROVIER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal Nos. 901901399 
901901400 
(Consolidated) 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on 
June 19, 1990, at 1:30 p.m., at the Fifth Judicial District 
Courthouse located in Parowan, Utah, pursuant to a Motion to 
Suppress filed on behalf of the above-named Defendants by their 
attorney of record, Loni F. DeLand, and Defendants Petie Kay Hale 
and David Vance Grovier having appeared in person at said time, 
together with their attorney of record, and the State of Utah 
having been present and represented by Iron County Attorney 
Scott M. Burns, and the Court having reviewed the Defendants' 
Motion together with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of said Motion and the Court having further reviewed a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress, and the Court having thereafter 
heard testimony and evidence from Cedar City Chief 0f 
nnrn AA 
Police J* Peter Hansen, Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force 
Agent Lynn Davis, Cedar City Police Sergeant Dennis Anderson, 
Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility Officer Gary 
Bulloch, as well as having heard proffered testimony and evidence 
from witnesses, and having heard testimony and evidence from 
Defendant David Vance Grovier. Moreover, the Court received a 
stipulation by and between the Defendants and the State of Utah 
that the Statement of Facts contained in the Memorandum prepared 
by the State of Utah are accurate and correct in all respects and 
shall be used as a basis for the Court to make its determination 
(See a copy of said Memorandum, marked as Exhibit "A", attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference); moreover, the 
stipulated facts were to be supplemented by testimony and 
evidence from the witnesses called during the suppression 
hearing, and the Court having reviewed the stipulated facts 
contained in the Memorandum prepared by the State of Utah, and 
thereafter having fully reviewed the file and heard the testimony 
and evidence, the Court now makes and enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows, to wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based upon the stipulation of the Defendants and the State 
of Utah regarding the Court's receipt of the Statement of Facts 
contained in the State of Utah's Memorandum as being undisputed, 
as well as the testimony and evidence heard during the 
suppression hearing, the Court finds the following facts to be 
true and accurate by clear and convincing evidence: 
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1. On February 23, 1990, Officer Lynn Davis of the Cedar 
City Police Department, currently assigned to the Iron/Beaver 
Counties Narcotics Task Force, was at the Circuit Court complex 
located in Cedar City, Utah, when he received a call on his pager 
to contact a confidential informant regarding information about 
the possession or sale of illegal narcotics. 
2. Agent Davis contacted the confidential informant 
(hereinafter referred to as "C.I.") regarding the information 
relating to illegal drugs at approximately 10:30 a.m. (See page 
15 of transcript of March 19, 1990, preliminary hearing, 
hereinafter referred to as the "transcript".) The conversation 
Agent Davis had with the C.I. was all by telephone and lasted 
approximately two to three minutes. (See transcript, p. 22.) 
3. The C.I. informed Agent Davis that (a) there was a 
green Buick vehicle in town, (b) the persons that were driving 
the vehicle had controlled substances in the vehicle and that the 
vehicle was in Cedar City, Utah, (c) the license plate number of 
the vehicle was 175BAT or 175BAP, (d) there were two (2) persons 
in the vehicle—one male and one female, (e) the vehicle was at 
the south end of town the last time the C.I. saw the vehicle, and 
(f) the C.I. had observed drugs in the vehicle, said drugs 
described as a white powdery or tan powdery substance. (See 
transcript, pp. 15, 16, 22-31.) 
4. Thereafter, Agent Davis relayed this information to 
Cedar City Chief of Police Pete Hansen who, in turn, located the 
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subject vehicle and had one of his officers (Sergeant Dennis 
Anderson) effectuate a stop of the vehicle on Main Street in 
Cedar City# Utah, in front of the Iron County/Utah State 
Correctional Facility. (See transcript, pp. 33-35.) After 
Sergeant Dennis Anderson stopped the Defendants' vehicle, 
Sergeant Anderson had a discussion with Defendant David Vance 
Grovier and informed him that he had been stopped because police 
I 
had information regarding drugs and that "the police were going 
to want to search his car," and Defendant David Vance Grovier 
consented to said search and informed Sergeant Anderson that lfI 
don't have anything in the car" and "go ahead and search if you 
want to." Thereafter, Sergeant Anderson told Defendant David 
Vance Grovier that he wanted to search and that there were other 
officers coming that were going to look in the car, and Defendant 
David Vance Grovier stated, again, that "he didn't have anything 
and to go ahead and look." 
5. The Defendants' vehicle was stopped between 11:15 and 
11:30 a.m. (See transcript, p. 38.) After the vehicle was 
stopped, Chief Hansen approached the passenger, Defendant Petie 
Kay Hale, observed Officer Kelvin Orton perform a cursory search 
of her waist area for weapons, and then Chief Hansen took a 
"fanny pack" (purse-type bag that wraps around the waist of a 
person) from Petie Kay Hale's person, opened the same, and found 
a marijuana pipe inside. (See transcript, pp. 36-38.) 
I 
Thereafter, Chief Hansen gave Defendant David Vance Grovier his 
rights per miranda (See transcript, p. 39) and informed the 
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Defendant they had stopped him because they were informed he had 
drugs in his car, a request was made to search the car by Chief 
Hansen, and the Defendant said, "Go ahead and look.11 (See 
transcript, p. 39.) Thereafter, Chief Hansen informed Defendant 
David Vance Grovier that, by giving his consent to a search of 
his car, he was consenting to a search of the trunk, under the 
hood and engine area of the vehicle, and the entire passenger 
area of the vehicle, and Defendant David Vance Grovier said he 
understood the full scope of the search and that he consented to 
the same. 
6. Chief Hansen then "asked him if he understood that— 
or if he was allowing us, giving us consent to search his entire 
car. And he said that he was." (See transcript, p. 39.) 
Thereafter, Chief Hansen instructed Cedar City Police Officers 
Ken Stapley and Ronnie Judkins to search the car for narcotics, 
which they did, and after approximately twenty (20) minutes they 
could not find any narcotics in the vehicle. (See transcript, 
p. 40.) 
7. At this point, Cedar City Police Chief J. Peter Hansen 
testified that "I told him (Defendant David Vance Grovier) that 
it was my belief that there were drugs in the car and that he 
knew that there were drugs in the car. I asked him if he would 
care to make it easier on everybody and just tell us where they 
were. He denied that there were drugs in the car. I told him it 
was our intention, then, to remove the car from the street, take 
it into the sally port at the correctional facility and dismantle 
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it piece by piece until we found drugs. He said, 'Go for it.'" 
(See transcript, p. 40.) Chief Hansen has testified that, 
thereafter, he had the vehicle moved to the sally port at the 
correctional facility based upon the Defendant's consent as well 
as for safety factors as the vehicle was parked at or near a 
highway at a busy time. (See transcript, p. 41.) The distance 
from the place of the initial stop, to the sally port garage area 
of the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility to where the 
vehicle was moved, is approximately two hundred (200) yards. 
8. The vehicle arrived at the sally port at the Iron 
County/Utah State Correctional Facility at approximately 
12:00 p.m. and Agent Lynn Davis was summoned to conduct a full 
search of the vehicle at that time. Defendant David Vance 
Grovier was taken to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional 
Facility, was held in the booking area of the correctional 
facility, and had another conversation with Chief Hansen in which 
the Defendant said, "You do not have permission to dismantle my 
car" (See transcript, p. 43), whereupon Chief Hansen informed the 
officers "not to dismantle the car" but to continue with the 
search for the narcotics. (See transcript, pp. 43-44.) 
9. After 12:00 noon but before 1:00 p.m., Agent Lynn Davis 
of the Task Force arrived at the sally port, searched the vehicle 
for approximately twenty (20) minutes, and located approximately 
one-third (1/3) pound of the controlled substance 
methamphetamine. Agent Davis located the methamphetamine in a 
heater hose underneath the driver's portion of the vehicle, Agent 
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Davis having pushed the heater hose aside to reach up under the 
dash when the heater hose end fell away and revealed a brown 
cloth that was folded up and stuffed in the end of the heater 
hose, said item later determined to contain the approximately 
one-third (1/3) pound of methamphetamine. (See transcript, 
pp. 9-11.) 
10. Defendant David Vance Grovier did not inform Cedar City 
Police Sergeant Dennis Anderson, or any other person, to "not 
touch his car" or to "have the officers stay away from his car." 
On the contrary, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that David Vance Grovier never withdrew his consent to search his 
vehicle, at any time, and that the Defendant was never coerced, 
threatened, or under any duress at any time by police officers or 
other persons; in fact, the Court finds from the Defendant's own 
testimony that he was never threatened or coerced at any time 
during the search of his vehicle. 
11. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and 
from direct testimony of the peace officers that testified, that 
if Defendant David Vance Grovier had made any statement 
calculated to revoke his consent to search the vehicle, they 
(each of the officers) would have immediately stopped the search. 
The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Defendant never made any statements, to any peace officer, in the 
nature of "stop the search" or "don't search anymore" of "don't 
touch my car" but, rather, Defendant David Vance Grovier 
H7-
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consented t»'» a search of his vehicle on rtt least three (3) 
separate occasions and never withdrew said t'-u ristMit . 
1 2 . The Court finds b} clear ai id convincing evidence that 
t statements of "someone's going to sue mvei this" 
and "these officers better not tear up m~ i m " .mid, dun't 
dismantle my car" wer* imiting statements made by Defendant 
d""it in»") f \ s* M r""•"'" as did* said limits of 
the search, placed police officers by the Defendant, were 
never exceeded and, t!> fficers did not exceed the 
scope ""'»'" i hv ''onsont Com t f i. ods by clear and 
convincing evidence that Agent Davis found the methamphetamine by 
looking up under the dash and a heater hose (undamped at either 
end and cont d i a i • i< j M m M|I|»M'J.X I P M U nun t.hiL'l | ' ,» '" | <J' of 
methamphetamine) simply fell away as Agent Davis moved it aside 
v :ia.nu * 
13, The Court finds by clear -JM \i vonv t nu i nq ev .idem, * • that 
Agent Davis did not beyond the scope permitted by the 
Ifpf ericlai'i! " « rnnsent ana aiu not damage the -• dismantle the 
car, tear the car apart 0<r ^o anything bir ••>. - . pu'-di rii.'de an 
unconnected heater hose which contained the hidden controlled 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and 
or the police 
officers to stop the Defendants vehicle and place them under 
arrest for the felony offense of Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Methamphetamine, sa i d probable 
cause based upon ,ir id suhstanf i a 1 facts that would 
lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to believe that a 
felony was present] - ^ committed, and supported by the 
stipulated f acts, "I * ion irom 
a confidential informant, who had supplied him with reliable 
information on many occasions * > * • there 
was a green t - 3 
present time, (b) that the persons that were driving the vehicle 
j
 i e d substance in the vehicle at the present time, (c) 
thai, tl*i- license plate number of 1 tie vehicle wa W M >r 
175BAP, 1 that there were two persons in the vehicle—one 
1"en> J I P. , (e) that tue vehicle was presently at; the 
south end of Cedar City, State of Utah, and Il . had 
observed drugs i n the vehicle, said drugs described, as a white 
dPi'V subsf «inc t<> h*- Linved to be methamphetamine. 
2. The Court finds that Cedar City Police officers, on 
February 23, 199* lad probable cause ^ Defendants' 
vehic * < - t tme based 
upon information received from a reliable confidential informant 
regarding Defendants' immediate possession of the controlled 
substance - tphet ain 1 ne 
Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and 
a matter of law, that Defendant David Vance Grovier consented 
1 (j a warrantless search - - ie .HImil thril Baul consent to 
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sea r evoked or withdrawi , and said 
consent is a recognized exception to a warrantless sean : ::!: 1. 
4. The Court finds bry clear - , convincing evidence, and 
as a i tn.iV! 1, in? ivonsen T David Vance Grovier 
was unequivocal and specific and freely 1 
and that said consent was given without duress c coercion, 
express or imr>^  is conclusion 
of after indulging every reasonable presumption against the 
\ *. trie fundamental constitutional right and that the 
evidence tha*" ^ ^ Uetend^ut WMIV^II pju-'n and 
convincing. 
5. lii Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and 
as a matter of law, that the search by Cedat (/'i*y l'"u] j \ «v i'Mirers 
and Agent Davis did exceed the scope of the consent given as 
f; !"u,- Defendant Wo;, ul that, officers would search his entire 
car (trunk# engine area, and al 1 throughout | i. .eiiger 
compartments) and Defendant clearly consented thereto. 
6. IIK> L'IJIM I I MIII ill, i le .I i in onvincing evidence, and 
as a matter of. jaw, that lime Lime .in which the search took was 
cleariy reasonable applying common sense and the ordinary human 
experience aim • IMI 'J • [nil ice o>f * > diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely : . confirm or dispel their 
suspicions as quickly as possible under the circumstances. 
7 T1^^ rmirt idence, and 
as a matter search : v.^ Defendants " /ehicle 
nI ion c cue methamphetamine was proper and 
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appi< . .nat said methamphetamine should not be 
suppressed. 
8. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, and 
as I I he cocaine and drug paraphernalia 
located police officers i n t ht" "l" ( 111 J i
 f p.i, h "" ' I if- f r r»d/i n t 
Petie Kay Hale was obtained withoul warrant and that no 
acceptable except j on in * M r rant, less search existed (it was not 
incident to arrest, the items were not <n ni -w tn < was 
consent obtained, no hot pursuit lutomobile exception, no 
stop and frisk exigent circumstances), 
therefore the items were seized pursuant to an 
lal search and the same should be suppressed as a 
matter of -
DATED this CP^f - day of ^---Ju^t-^
 r 1990, 
J./^HILIP EVES/ 
Dj^trict Court*'Judge 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that mailed 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF CONCLUSIONS ... _/.<• ,.w Mr« 
Loni - * y 101 Defendants, 1 3 2 South 
600 East, Sal? *.- * ^ 84102, by first -class mail, 
postage fully prepaid, on this p2y ^  day of ~3FJAhlE 
1990. 
^Oecrctagy 
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